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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HARRY CHILD, also known as 
HENRY CHILD, 
Pla~ntiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
EUGENE A. CHILD and ARVILLA 
CHILD, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case 
No. 8869 
PETITION FOR A REHEARING AND BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT THEREOF 
·COME now the defendants and appellants in the 
above entitled action and jointly and severally respect-
fully petition the Court to grant a rehearing in the above 
entitled cause for the reason and upon the ground that 
in its Opinion heretofore written the Court erred in the 
following particulars: 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS STATEMENT OF THE EVI-
DENCE IN SEVERAL MATERIAL PARTICULARS. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN THE BASIS OF ITS APPRAISAL 
OF 'THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE TRIAL COURT BY FINDING THAT THE EVI-
DENCE IN FAVOR OF ·THE RESPONDENT'S CASE IS 
CLEAR AND .CONVINCING AND IN AFFIRMING THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
I, the undersigned attorney for the appellants and 
defendants herein, certify that in my opinion there is 
merit to the foregoing claim and that the Court com-
Initted errors in the particulars above specified. 
J. GRANT IVERSON 





DENCE IN SEVERAL MATERIAL PARTICULARS. 
The evidence in support of the Trial Court's findings 
and judgment, a~ the evidence i~ stated to be in this 
Court's Decision, is not clear and convincing. Tllis is 
nwre apparent if ~eYeral errors in the stateinents of the 
evidence are eorreeted. 
ln reviewing the erueial evidenee, thi~ Court stated: 
.. Eugene's letter in repl~y i~ of critical im-
portance *** llarry Child said that Hazel received 
Eugene·~ an~wer to her letter and read it to him 
• • • The undisputed faet is that Hazel withdrew 
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the money from Eugene's account and gave it to 
Harry, who took it to Mr. Warnock and had the 
deed made out to himself. Later, on hi's own 
initiative, he had a deed made from himself to 
E1tgene and had it recorded." (Italics throughout 
this brief are defendants) 
The statement that Harry ·Child said that Hazel read 
the letter to him is not correct. 
The evidence of Harry Child on cross-examination 
on this matter is as follows: 
"Q. You didn't ever see the letter~ 
A. I never saw the letter." ( Tr. 23) 
The evidence of Harry Child on direct examination 
on this subject is as follows: 
''A. Oh, yes, she must have written to Eugene. 
She apparently got word back that it was 
O.K. I don't know. I never saw it." (Tr. 14) 
There is no evidence to the effect that when Harry 
took the money to Mr. Warnock he "had the deed made out 
to himself and later, on his own initiative, had the deed 
made to Eugene". The evidence is undisputed that on 
April 16, 1945, Hazel drove with Harry to Salt Lake. 
Harry testified: 
"Yes, the only thing that riveted it in my 
mind, of her giving the money, we drove in town 
and I parked right there on First South,* * *T 
remember I got out of the car before she would 
give me that money* * *she would not give me the 
money until she said, 'Will you put that property 
in Eugene's name to secure the loan~'* * * I said, 
'Absolutely, I will put the property in Eugene's 
name to secure the loan." ( Tr. 15) 
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Harry then took the money to :\1 r. Warnock, who 
gave him the deed made out to I-Ienry Child, as grantee, 
executed by l(athryn lone Griffith Rankin, as grantor, 
dated April10, 1945 (six days before) and acknowledged 
in California. (Exhibit No. 1) He immediately rejoined 
Hazel. She asked for the deed. He told her it was made 
out in his name and he would have to have the deed 
made out from himself to Eugene, because he had pro-
Inised that he would do so. (Tr. 16-17) 
They imn1ediately went to the office of a friend of 
Harry's, Albert Toronto, and there n1ade out a deed 
(Exhibit No. 2), bearing the date of April 16, 1945, 
executed by Henry Child and Hazel _jiarie Child, as 
grantors, to Eugene A. Child, as grantee. 
These, with other errors in statement of the evidence 
cannot but raise a question as to "\Yhether the evidence 
as appraised by the Court was taken fron1 he Briefs of 
counsel or fr01n the record. There were so many mis-
statements and false assun1ptions and inferences in re-
spondent's Brief that appellant in his Reply Brief, Point 
IV, called attention to eleven such 1natters of significant 
importance. 
In a case such a~ thi~. the original transcript of the 
evidence is of indispensable i1nportanee. It is for that 
reason that the appellant throughout his Briefs has 
quoted verbatin1 the eritleal eYidence. The transcript of 
evidenee in thi~ mattPr alont' reflects the true state of the 
evidenee. 
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Another important statement made by the Court 
in its Decision is : 
"Notwithstanding Eugene's claim that his 
father, Harry, purchased the property solely for 
him, neither Eugene nor his mother, Hazel, who 
was on his side supporting him in the controversy, 
claim that he ever expressly stated that he would 
do so. Such result would have to be made out of 
the letter) which she failed to produce and which 
they claim stated that Eugene would not loan 
money to his father but the purchase would have 
to be made for himself." (page 2, Decision of the 
Court) 
Is it unusual that Harry and Eugene failed to pro-
duce a letter written in April 1945 at the trial held June 
14, 1957? The 11 years delay in bringing this case to trial 
after the date of the deed points up the laches of Harry 
Child in failing to bring this action until 1956, when such 
important evidence could not be expected to be pro-
duced. 
Coming back to the statement, "such result would 
have to be made out of the letter". There was much evi-
dence from which, it appears that Harry knew that 
Eugene and Hazel would not and did not let Harry use 
$300.00 of Eugene's money for any other purpose than 
to buy the land for Eugene. The following are smne items 
of evidence to this point: 
Brandt Child testified that the day the letter was 
received he was in the kitchen when Harry entered with 
the letter from Eugene in one hand and the envelope in 
the other hand, and he heard his father and mother dis-
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cuss the contents of the letter. He stated, "Yes, I remem-
ber mother saying, 'Why don't you sell some cows and 
buy it yourself1'" (Tr. 72). 
Hazel Chld testified: "I took the letter and read it 
and I read it back to him and Gene said, 'I don't want 
to loan Dad the money, but if he don't buy the land, I 
would like to buy the land, if you think it is a good 
proposition'." (Tr. 40). 
Also she testified, "l said, you see, if Gene buys the 
land, it will be Gene's. If you want the land, you had 
better buy the land yourself, sell two cows." (Tr. 40). 
He refused to sell two cows. As he testified, "She 
told me to sell cows to get the property, but a couple of 
cows wouldn't have brought enough money to buy the 
property or pay the balance and not only that, I didn !t 
have any cows that I wanted to sell. That u·as part of my 
plan." (Tr. 24) 
In other words, the eows were n1ore in1portant to him 
than the land. 
Also, Hazel testified : .. I told hi1n, I said, •you should 
have bought that land yourself. It was a good proposition. 
You should have bought that land yourself, but it is 
Gene's'. Everytiine we had any eonversation, I said, 'It's 
Gene's, you let hi1n buy it'.'' (Tr. 43) 
The truth of the aboYP state1uent is confirn1ed by the 
actions of Hazel and Harry when they were divorced in 
1955, before this action was sta rtrd. They Inade a Ininute 
division of property. The land in question was then worth 
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$40,000 to $50,000-more than all other assets of the par-
ties. She made no claim to any part of the property in 
question which she certainly would haye done if he owned 
it subject to a $300.00 mortgage to Eugene. He made no 
representation that the property in question was his. 
Since the basic problem is the intention of the parties 
at the time the deed was made, this evidence is of the 
utmost in1portance. 
Also, on cross-examination, Hazel testified: "Mr. 
child didn't borrow the money. Eugene bought the prop-
f'rty." (Tr. 63) 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN THE BASIS OF ITS APPRAISAL 
OF 'THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE. 
The Court stated at page 4 of the Decision, "The 
fundamental consideration is that there is nothing in-
credible or unnatural about Harry Child's contention 
that inasmuch as he conceived the idea of acquiring this 
property and nourished it for several years, finally 
overcoming the obstacles encountered in getting it, he 
did not agree to forego all interest in it himself and 
purchase it for Eugene." 
For Harry to prevail in this matter, the evidence 
must be clear and convincing that Eugene intended that 
his money be used as and for a loan and that the deed 
should be a mortgage to secure such loan. It is not enough 
that Harry did so intend. 
The appellant will discuss the evidence on this 
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matter hereafter. 
The law is plain that in such a situation as this, for 
one to prevail who attempts to establish that a written 
conveyance was something other than it purported to be, 
he must prove that both parties to the instrument intend-
ed that it should be something other than it on its face 
showed it to be. 
The law in this matter was laid down in Corey vs. 
Roberts, 82 rtah 445, 25 P. 2d 940. We quote from said 
case as follows: 
"It is likewise the law, where conveyances 
clear, unmnbiguous and unequivocal in their 
terms, are attacked by parol evidence seeking to 
establish a trust or give to the documents a mort-
gage construction, the party so seeking n1ust by 
clear, unequivocal and satisfactory proof establish 
the alleged trust or mortgage relationship. 
,.. :If: ,.. 
"Plaintiff concedes that, to establish any 
other relationship, she n1ust show by proof meet-
ing the standard required by the courts that the 
defendant was not a purchaser, but a nwrtgagee 
or trustee, or both, and that the deed was security 
for the debt owing by the plaintiff to the defend-
ant. Plaintiff also accepts the position that the 
proof n1ust sho\\- that both grantor and grantee 
understood that the eonYeyance was made as se-
curitY for the debt and not an ah~olute convey 
ance.' If plaintiff fails to n1eet these conditions 
and burdens of proof her action n1ust fail." 
This ~tate1nent of the law was rea.ffinned in S orthcrest, 
Inc. vs. Jflalkcr Bank and Trust Co., et al, 1:22 Utah 268, 
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matter hereafter. 
The law is plain that in such a situation as this, for 
one to prevail who attempts to establish that a written 
conveyance was something other than it purported to be, 
he must prove that both parties to the instrument intend-
ed that it should be something other than it on its face 
showed it to be. 
The law in this matter was laid down in Corey vs. 
Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940. We quote from said 
case as follows: 
"It is likewise the law, where conveyances 
clear, una1nbiguous and unequivocal in their 
terms, are attacked by parol evidence seeking to 
establish a trust or give to the documents a mort-
gage construction, the party so seeking 1nust by 
clear, unequivocal and satisfactory proof establish 
the alleged trust or n1ortgage relationship. 
* • * 
"Plaintiff concedes that, to establish any 
other relationship, she Inust show by proof meet-
ing the standard required by the courts that the 
defendant wa8 not a purchaser, but a mortgagee 
or trustee, or both. and that the deed was security 
for the debt owing by the plaintiff to the defend-
ant. Plaintiff also aceepts the position that the 
proof n1ust sho'v that both grantor and grantee 
under8tood that the ronYeyance was Blade as se-
euritY for the debt and not an absolute conveY 
ance.' If plaintiff fails to 1neet these conditio~s 
and burdens of proof her action Blust fail.'' 
This staternent of the law wa8 reaffirmed in Sorthcrest, 
Inc. 1'.-.·. lVa1ker Hank a11d Trust Co., ct al. 122 Utah 268, 
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:2-l-8 P. :2d 692. The statement of the Court is as follows: 
"Undisputed is the plaintiff's contention that 
one who asserts the invalidity of a deed must so 
prove by clear and convincing evidence. Thornley 
Livestock Co. vs. Gailey, 105 Utah 519, 143 P. 2d 
283; Corey vs. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940 
* * *. Plaintiff maintains further that whether an 
instrument is a deed or mortgage is a matter of in-
tention of the parties and it must appear not only 
that one but both parties, regarded it as a mort-
gage before it is so legally. There is no doubt that 
this is so. 36 Am. Jur., Mortgages, Section 132**. '' 
In the case of Gibbons 1;s. Gibbons, 103 l~tah 266, 
135 P. 2d 105, the Court stated: 
''The controlling question was what was the 
intention of the parties as it existed at the time 
of the execution and delivery of the instrument~" 
As the Court said in Beeler vs. American Trust 
Company, 147 P. 2d 583, 24 Cal. 2d 1, 
''The burden was on the plaintiff to prove 
that it was highly probable that the deed was not 
what it purported to be. He did not sustain this 
burden by evidence that at best is simply con-
sistent with the deed's being something else, but 
which is just as consistent with being what it pur-
ports to be.'' 
This statement is applicable to the evidence in this case. 
The evidence will be considered under the next point. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE TRIAL COURT BY FINDING THAT THE EVI-
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DENCE IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT'S CASE IS 
CLEAR AND ·CONVINCING AND IN AFFIRMING THE 
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
Considering the evidence upon the question of 
whether Eugene considered the deed a mortgage, the fol-
lowing is pertinent: 
'' Q. ~Ir. Child, have you ever considered at any 
time that the $300.00 you gave in 1945 was a 
loan secured by a mortgage on that prop-
erty~ 
A. No. 
Q. And the deed which was delivered to you by 
your father and mother was not, I take it 
then, in your mind a n1ortgage ? 
A. Absolutely not. 
Q. It was an absolute conveyance of title to 
youf 
.A.. That has always been 1ny mind. 
Q. And in the discussion \\ith your father, have 
you ever indicated any other understanding1 
Have you ever indicated anything else other 
than thai when you have discussed the mat-
ter with your fathert 
A. Just discussing the land is the only thing 
that has ever been discussed is that it's my 
land.'' 
(Tr. 88, 89) 
It would be repititious to again discuss the contents of the 
letters testified to by Eugene and Hazel and the testi-
mony of Brandt Child that despite the fact that Harry 
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Child stated that he had never seen the letter he was pres-
ent when Harry Child and Hazel Child discussed the 
letter and at the conclusion of the discussion Hazel said 
to Harry: "Why don't you sell some cows and buy it 
yourself~" (Tr.72) 
Eugene has always treated the property as his own, 
as evidenced by the following: 
1. He has paid the taxes for the last ten years 
at least. (Tr. 84) 
2. He has never asked his father for the repayment 
of $300.00 or any sum. (Tr. 84) 
3. His father has never offered to pay the $300 to 
Eugene. (Tr. 84) 
4. He rernoved top soil from the land, but did not 
secure his father's consent to its removal. (Tr. 84) 
5. He mortgaged the property to Bountiful State 
Bank in ~I arch of 1953 for $3,500. ('Tr. 85) 
6, He mortgaged the property to Earl Burnham 
in 1955 for $4,000 (Tr. 85) 
7. He sold one-half acre to the Government. (Tr. 85) 
8. He deeded a piece of the land to Harold Calder. 
(Tr. 87) 
9. He made a contract with Harold Calder, who wa8 
opening up a subdivision on the south of the land in 
question, for a road for the center of the road to go up the 
property so he, Eugene, could take advantage to open up 
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some land there and Mr. Calder could open up some land 
on the other side. ( Tr. 87) 
10. His father had nothing to do with either the sale 
of the land to the Government or the deal with :Mr. Cal-
der. (Tr. 87) 
11. He was sure that his father knew about the 
Government transaction, but Eugene didn't know whether 
Harry knew about the deal with Mr. Calder. He didn't 
mention it to him. He didn't see any reason to. (Tr. 88) 
12. He refused to let his father put a reservoir on 
the land, although he wanted to do so. (Tr. 88, 97) 
13. Mr. Ashdown, a neighbor, at the time he removed 
top soil from his, .Mr. Ashdown's land, asked permission 
of Eugene to go across the land in question. (Tr. 94) 
Is it credible to conclude in the light of this evidence 
that the evidence is clear, unequivocal and convincing 
that Eugene thought the deed was a security for a loan J 
The principles and rules of law are laid down to help 
effect justice. One of these rules is that property which 
has been deeded to a grantee shall not be taken away 
frmn hi1n except upon clear, unequivocal and convincing 
evidence. For 12 years Eugene has thought the property 
was his. He has treated it as his. Others have loaned 
hi1n money on the :"ecurity of the land. Others have pur-
chased parts of the land and haYe sought his permission 
to haul soil across the land. During tlris long period 
of tilne, could all third parties dealing with Harry and 
Eugene be 1nistaken as to who owned the land 1 If Harry 
had thought that the land was his, could he have kept 
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it a secret from 80 many people for so long a time? Is 
Eugene now deprived of the land on the oral, hearsay, 
incompetent statement of Harry Child that Hazel Child 
told him that in a letter Eugene had said she could lend 
Harry the money, and this despite the testimony of 
Eugene and Hazel concerning the contents of the letter 
that was received in reply? And despite the testimony of 
Hazel and Brandt that Harry received the letter and took 
it to the home where it was discussed at length, although 
Harry denied ever seeing the letter, and despite the 
testimony of Brandt that after they had discussed the 
letter Hazel said to Harry, '' \Vhy don't you sell so1ne 
cows and buy it yourself~" (Tr. 72) 
It appears to the defendants that the evidence out-
lined above is quantitatively and qualitatively greater 
than the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. 
Let us briefly discuss some of the inferences made 
by the Court on the evidence. At page 1 of the Decision, 
the Court observed that Hazel did not share Harry's en-
thusiasm for buying the property. This inference is not 
supported by the evidence, as Hazel testified : 
"Q. Did you say in that letter that purchase of 
that land was a good proposition? 
A. Yes. I thought it was. That's the reason I 
tried to get Mr. Child to buy it.'' 
(Tr. 55-56) 
It is true that she told him to sell some of his cows to 
raise the money. The transcript is filled with evidence 
by Hazel, Brandt and Eugene as to the difficulties the 
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family had encountered because of !-larry's failure to 
properly confine his cows. She had good reason not to 
turn over the water stock which she had received from 
Harry's sister when she paid off a note to him. She, by 
her own labor had earned and saved $600.00 to pay off the 
note when Harry refused to repay his sister a loan ·which 
was long, past due. (Tr. 37-38) She apparently did not 
care to go to work again and save money to pay off 
another loan for Harry or probably lose the water stock, 
if she did not. 
This Court stated: "It was he (Harry) who conceived 
the original idea of purchasing this property and nour-
ished it to fruition* * * They do not point out what 
Harry Child was to gain by turning over his favorable 
option to Eugene. In carrying out the details of the 
transaction and doing all the work on the property he 
did all for the benefit of a son whom they now claim at 
the age 17 did not trust his own father and declared he 
would not loan hi1n n1oney. If Eugene is to prevail, it 
must be on the basis that he was that kind of a son, but 
his father benignly overlooked the rebuff and in spite 
of it put in several years tilne and effort to see that 
Eugene got the sole benefit of the property." 
The inference frmu this state1nent is that Harry had 
an intense desire to purchase the land which persisted 
for ~·ear~ and that he expended great effort in ac-
quiring and many ~·ears in in1proving the property. The 
evidence is that in 1941 and 19-t-2 he ·wanted the land 
because it had a hollo'v running up through it in which 
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he might impound water. He did not in any of his testi-
mony state that he wanted to purchase the property as 
an investment. "I wanted to put a reservoir up there 
for one thing and store a lot of water that was going to 
waste* * * Also I could use the land to pasture my cows". 
(Tr. 7.) He checked the records at Fannington and 
learned that Mrs. Griffith owned the land. He wrote 
to her in California. He heard from Mr. Warnock, her 
agent in Salt Lake City. He offered :Mr. Warnock $300.00. 
(Tr. 8) :Nir. Warnock told Harry he didn't think she 
would accept it. In 1945 he leaned that Mrs. Griffith 
had died. He again offered $300.00 to Mr. Warnock. His 
offer was accepted. (Tr. 11) He paid $25.00 and went 
about raising the $275.00 balance. He got $300.00 fron1 
Hazel and took it to Mr. "\Varnock and received the deed. 
He staked some cows and horses on the land. In 1950 
and 1951 he spent $200.00 plus approximately $100.00 for 
rental of trucks in putting a fence around it. (Tr. 116) 
This is the total amount spent in "improving" the land 
in eleven years. In fact, in that area a fence was no real 
improvement. 
Harry gained 1nuch more than he spent on the pro-
perty by buying it for Eugene. On this subject, Eugene 
testified as follows: 
'' Q. Counsel asked you if you ever reimbursed 
your father for the fence he put on your 
property. Do you want to make an explana-
tion to the answer you made? 
A. Well, he asked me if I ever reimbursed him 
in cash for it. I figured his reimbursement 
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come in the fact that he was putting cows 
on my piece of land up there and he had been 
paying in years past hundreds of dollars for 
pasture land.'' 
There is no evidence that ''all the work he did on the 
property," which was only putting on a fence at a cost 
of $200 to $300, was "for the benefit of a son whom they 
now claim at 17 did not trust his father." Let us examine 
this statement. The fence was no benefit to Eugene, ex-
cept as it benefited the whole fanrily by keeping Harry's 
cows away frmn neighbors' gardens and lawns and thus 
embarrassing the family. It does not enhance the value 
of the property. 
The defendants do not clain1 that Eugene did not 
trust his father. The evidence on this point is as follows: 
'' Q. Did you ever have any reason to think if 
you loaned your Dad money you would never 
get it back' 
A. Frmn the past dealings, it ·wasn't so much 
that he V{ouldn 't pay it back. I wouldn't 
doubt for a 1ninute that he "\vouldn't pay it 
back if he had it, but he just put everything 
in the eow~ and neYer had it to pay back to 
anybody. 
Q. But you knew if you asked the jury you could 
get it back, didn't you? 
A. Not necessarily. I had ju~t as soon not even 
borrow it. I bought the land.·' 
(Tr. 98) 
The plaintiff does not attempt to contradict the 
tP~tinwny of Hazel that Harry "\Vouldn 't or couldn't, pay 
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the $600.00 he had o·wed his sister for years. Hazel testi-
fied that after the sister had repeatedly asked for the 
money, Harry would say that she didn't need it. Hazel 
finally worked and saved enough to pay it herself. (Tr. 
37, 38) These things were no doubt well known to Eugene. 
Money loaned and not repaid is a source of friction. 
As Shakespeare said through his character, Polonius: 
"Neither a borrower nor a lender be, for a loan oft loses 
both itself and friend and borrowing dulls the edge of 
husbandry". Was Eugene \:vrong in following this advice 1 
That Harry's credit was not good at the time is ob-
vious. He very apparently couldn't borrow $275.00 un-
secured. The only collateral, except some 20 cows, he 
had, was the water stock Hazel was holding, which 
we have discussed above. The only available source of 
money was his cows. This fact and his attitude towards 
selling the cows, from his own testimony, is a key to the 
whole situation. The defendants urge the Court to give 
consideration to the testimony, not only of Hazel and Eu-
gene and Brandt, but of Harry himself on this point. 
At the expense of being repetitious, the defendants submit 
the following testimony of Harry: 
'' Q. Do you have a recollection of the very day 
you bought that property Mrs. Child told you 
to go and sell a couple of cows and get the 
money if ~;ou wanted to buy that property 1 
A. She told me to go and sell cows to get the 
property, but a couple of cows wouldn't have 
brought enough money to buy the property 
or pay the balance, and not only that, I 
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didn't have any cows that I wanted to sell. 
That was part of my plan. 
(Tr. 24) 
On direct examination, Harry testified as follows: 
'' Q. And did you agree then to sell some cows 
to raise the money 1 
A. No, I did not, because that was part of 
my, the cows were part of my program." 
This testimony points up the fact that Harry had no 
intense desire to purchase this property, particularly 
if it necessitated selling a couple of cows. 
Another important statement in the Opinion is the 
following: "Consistent with Harry Child's claims and the 
findings of the trial court are the undisputed facts that 
he "·ent into possession of the property* * *and has at 
all times remained in possession and exercised general 
dominion over it". 
As to this point, the defendants in their Reply Brief 
(at pages 19-23) discussed the 1natter of what constitutes 
possession and quoted the law, citing l\Tatio11al Cypress 
Pole & Pilillg Co. Y. Hemphill Lumber Co., 325 :\Io. 807, 
31 S.\V. 2d 1059, 1063, as follows: 
''Possession of land has been defined as the 
actual control by physical occupation and the 
holding .and exercising dmuinion over it; that 
position or relation which giYes one its use and 
control and exrludes all others frmn like use or 
control." 
ll nder this definition, Harry Child did not have posses-
sion of thP propprt~·. _He had only permissiYe use therof. 
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\Vithout going into deail, defendants call attention to the 
facts delineated in their Brief, which were si1nply these: 
1. Harry wanted to purchase the property for 
the purpose of putting a reservoir thereon. Eu-
gene refused to let him build a reservoir thereon. 
2. Eugene removed top soil, for which he re-
ceived $500.00 or $600.00, no part of which Harry 
ever claimed until the Complaint in this case was 
filed. 
3. \Vhen ~1r. Ashdown desired to remove top 
soil from his property, it was Eugene and not 
Harry to whom he made application for the right 
to cross the property. If Harry had been in pos-
session and exercising general dominion over the 
property, this would not have happened. 
4. Harold Calder obtained a part of the proper-
ty. 
5, Bountiful State Bank and Earl Burnham 
loaned Eugene money on the property. 
6. The \\" eber River Project purchased part of 
the property from Eugene. 
7. Eugene paid all the taxes for 10 years. Harry 
never offered to pay the taxes. 
8. Harry never offered to pay $300.00 to Eugene. 
Merely pasturing his cows on the property, while Eugene 
dealt with all third parties, many of them neighbors 
living in the immediate vicinity, indicates that no one 
considered that Harry was in possession and exercising 
general dominion over the land. 
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Defendants appreciate the fact that there is some 
difficulty in detennining what is clear and convincing 
evidence under the rules laid down for so determining. 
:However, defendants desire to cite what apparently has 
become the rule in Utah and contrast it with the evidence 
in this matter. In Chambers vs. E1nery, 45 P. 192, 13 l'tah 
37 4, the Court said : 
''So, in IIowland v. Blake, 97 U.S. 624, the 
Supreme Court, speaking through ~Ir. Justice 
Hunt, said: 'In each case the burden rests upon 
the moving party of overcoming the strong pre-
sumption arising from the terms of a written 
instrument. If the proofs are doubtful and un-
satisfactory, if there is a failure to overcome this 
presumption, entirely plain and convincing be-
yond reasonable controversy, the writing ·will be 
held to express correctly the intention of the 
parties.' Citing 1 Story Eq. Jur., Sec. 157; Porn. 
Eq. J ur., Sec. 1040, and several U. S. and State 
Court decisions.'' 
In Jensen vs. Howell, 282 P. 103-1, 75 rtah 6-1, .Jir. Justice 
Straup haid down the rule as follows : 
··In such ea~e~ (equity rases) on appeal and 
a review on questions of both law and fact and on 
the challenge of findings, the reYiew in effect is 
a trial de novo on the record. On such a review, 
if, after 1naking due allowance a~ to the better 
opportunity of the trial court to observe the de-
rne.anor of the wi tne~se~. or detennining their 
credibility and the weight of their evidence, we on 
the rerord neYerthPll'~~ are persuaded that a chal-
lenged finding i:::; against the fair preponderance 
or 0 T<'a tPr Wt'~ ~~·h t of the evidenre or not sup,ported n ~ 
h~· it. we disapprove it and n1ake or direct a fiind-
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ing, or remand the case for further proceedings; 
otherwise we .affirm it.'' 
In Sine v. Harper, 222 P. 2d 571, 118 Utah 415, Mr. 
Justice Latimer stated: 
"The Court below determined that the evi-
dence was sufficiently clear and convincing to 
satisfy his mind beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
mutual mistake of fact existed. We are, therefore, 
compelled to analyze the evidence and detern1ine 
whether it is sufficient from the standpoint oi 
quality and quantity to sustain the findings of 
the Trial Judge. vVhile the terms 'clear and con-
vincing' are relative and are not capable of mea-
surement, they carry an element of certainty. Mr. 
Justice Wolfe, in the c.ase of Greener v. Greener 
(Utah) 212 P.2d 194, 204, defines 'clear and con-
vincing' in a very appropriate way. In that opin-
ion he distinguishes between the phrases 'pre-
ponderance of the evidence' and 'clear and con-
vincing evidence' in the following language: 
"'* * * that proof is convincing which carries 
with it, not only the power to persuade the mind 
as to the probable truth or correctness of the fact 
it purports to prove, but has the element of clinch-
ing such truth or correctness. Clear and convinc-
ing proof clinches what might be otherwise only 
probable '"' ''' ':f. but for a matter to be clear and 
convincing to a particular mind it must h.ave 
reached the point where there remains no serious 
or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the 
conclusion. A mind which was of the opinion that 
it was convinced and yet which entertained not 
a slight but .a reasonable doubt as to the correct-
ness of its conclusion, would seem to be in a state 
of confusion.' 
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In the same case, in a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice 
Wolf stated: 
"The thought I am anxious to emphasize is 
that while we take into consideration the advan-
taged position of the fact finder in that he views 
the live scene as against our reading the dead 
record, there must also be a factor allowed for 
differences we may except in reasonable minds. 
We cannot set up our conclusions as being the 
only ones which reasonable minds could arrive at, 
even had we the advantage of the imponderables. 
"In other words, the degree of proof which 
requires clear, unequivocal and convincing evi-
dence in order to conclude for or against a certain 
issue is of i1nportance and should be observed. 
It is used where one is charged with fraud be-
cause a party should not be stigmatized with fraud 
b~· a simple preponderance of evidence ; in cases 
where it is necessary to set aside a release or a 
contract because of claimed fraud or mutual mis-
take of fact: in cases where reforn1 of a contract 
is asked to cmnport with what is clain1ed to ex-
press the alleged real intent of the parties at the 
tin1e the contract was 1nade: in those cases where 
the courts are asked to do smnething which will 
change the situation frmn that which on the sur-
face appears to be, where the parties have placed 
then1selves or \\·here the situation should remain 
a~ it 0xists, unless the court is n1orally convinced 
that justice requires that it be altered, and in 
other cases where public policy requires that 
status be not disturbed until the proof goes be-
~·ond a mere or fair preponderance. 
''But there are degrees of proof between evi-
dence which nwrely or barely preponderates and 
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ing, or remand the case for further proceedings; 
otherwise we affirm it.'' 
In Sine v. Harper, 222 P. 2d 571, 118 Utah 415, Mr. 
Justice Latimer stated: 
''The Court below determined that the evi-
dence was sufficiently clear and convincing to 
satisfy his mind beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
mutual mistake of fact existed. We are, therefore, 
compelled to analyze the evidence and determine 
whether it is sufficient from the standpoint of 
quality and quantity to sustain the findings of 
the Trial Judge. While the terms 'clear and con-
vincing' are relative and are not capable of mea-
surement, they carry an element of certainty. Mr. 
Justice vV olfe, in the case of Greener v. Greener 
(Utah) 212 P.2d 194, 204, defines 'clear and con-
vincing' in a very appropriate way. In that opin-
ion he distinguishes between the phrases 'pre-
ponderance of the evidence' and 'clear and con-
vincing evidence' in the following language: 
"'* * * that proof is convincing which carries 
with it, not only the power to persuade the mind 
as to the probable truth or correctness of the fact 
it purports to prove, but has the element of clinch-
ing such truth or correctness. Clear and convinc-
ing proof clinches what might be otherwise only 
probable #., "' '" but for a matter to be clear and 
convincing to a particular mind it must have 
reached the point where there remains no serious 
or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the 
conclusion. A mind which was of the opinion that 
it was convinced and yet which entertained not 
a slight but a reasonable doubt as to the correct-
ness of its conclusion, would seem to be in a state 
of confusion.' 
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In the same case, in a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice 
Wolf stated : 
"The thought I am anxious to emphasize is 
that while we take into consideration the advan-
taged position of the fact finder in that he views 
the live scene as against our reading the dead 
record, there must also be a factor allowed for 
differences we may except in reasonable minds. 
We cannot set up our conclusions as being the 
only ones which reasonable minds could arrive at, 
even had we the advantage of the imponderables. 
"In other words, the degree of proof which 
requires clear, unequivocal and convincing evi-
dence in order to conclude for or against a certain 
issue is of importance and should be observed. 
It is used where one is charged with fraud be-
cause a p.arty should not be stigmatized with fraud 
by a sirnple preponderance of evidence; in cases 
where it is necessary to set aside a release or a 
contract because of claimed fraud or mutual mis-
take of fact~ in cases where reforn1 of a contract 
is asked to comport with what is clain1ed to ex-
press the alleged real intent of the parties at the 
time the contract was rnade; in those cases where 
the courts are asked to do sornething which will 
change the situation froru that which on the sur-
face appears to be, where the parties have placed 
themselves or where the situation should remain 
as it exif'ts. unless the court is n1orally convinced 
that justiee requires that it be altered, .and in 
other rases where public policy requires that 
status be not disturbed until the proof goes be-
rond a rnere or fair preponderance. 
''But there are degrees of proof between evi-
dence which rnerely or barely preponderates and 
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where it preponderates to a convincing degree just 
as there may be degrees between that evidence 
which convinces and that which proves a fact to 
a certainty. Evidence may be such as to create 
a definite probability that a conclusion is correct, 
but not reaching convincingness, it may have 
passed the point of equipoise and also the point 
of bare or 1nere preponderance and reached a 
point of definite probability, but may not have 
reached the point of conviction. I have taken oc-
casion to deal at some length on these degrees of 
proof, because there is an increasing tendency to 
ignore them and put all proof on a flat plane of 
mere preponderance and this sort of result may be 
accomplished by the legerdemain of telling our-
selves as reviewers that if it is convincing to a 
trial judge, regardless of how it appears to us, 
we should accept it as convincing to us. I do not 
go that far. I think such reasoning is definitely on 
the side of retrogression.'' 
Invoking the standards set forth in the above cases, 
the defendants submit that the evidence as set forth in 
the transcript cannot reach a degree that is clear, un-
equivocal and convincing that Eugene considered the deed 
a mortgage. We have delineated the evidence as to Eu-
gene's intent above. The evidence counter thereto is, 
primarily, the statements of Harry Child. Uncorrobo-
rated, his evidence is weak and inconclusive. On the criti-
cal matter of the contents of the letter, he is contradicted 
by Hazel, Eugene and Brandt. True, the matter of weight 
is not a matter of "counting noses,'' but there comes 
a point when the number opposed to one witness certainly 
must carry some weight. If the three witnesses mentioned 
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gave any evidence of dishonesty in their evidence, the 
Court would be justified in disregarding their testimony. 
But as set forth at length in appellants' Reply Brief, 
their testimony is more straightforward, consistent and 
should be more convincing than Harry's testimony. He 
stands alone and uncorroborated. The fact that he is an 
interested witness who stands to gain $50,000 for some-
thing for which he has paid nothing seriously impairs the 
validity of his testimony. His testimony is contradictory 
in several respects, as set forth in said Reply Brief 
When he was divorced from his wife neither she nor he 
claimed the property belonged to Harry. He certainly 
knew, over the period of 12 years, that Eugene was deal-
ing with the property, as the evidence now shows. It is 
inconceivable that living near Eugene and near to the 
property every day during that period he was so unaware 
of what was transpiring as he would have us believe. He 
made no claim to the money for the top soil and he made 
no claim to any part of the nwney received from the 
sale of the land to the Govern1nent. He never offered to 
pay the $300.00 to Eugene and he paid no taxes. 
There is one fact which is the key to Harry's actions, 
a statement, which is not denied by Harry Child, in :Mr. 
Toronto's office when the deed was 1nade frmn Harry 
and Hazel to Eugene. The following is the testimony: 
"Q. "\Vhile you were in ~Ir. Toronto's office. did 
i\Lr. Cl{ild say anything about what he would 
do after Gene c.a1ue hmne if the property 
was in Gene's na1ne? 
A. He said, ·l-Ie's just a kid, he doesn't know 
what he is talking about and I'll settle with 
hi1n when he emnes hmue.' · 
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It is apparent that Harry Child would not sell cows 
to buy the property and he knew that it was the intention 
of Hazel and Eugene that the deed should be an absolute 
conveyance. He took his chance, that when Eugene came 
back he could talk him into deeding the property back. 
This was not an unreasonable anticipation, because the 
property was not worth any considerable amount in ex-
cess of the price Eugene paid for it, $300.00. However, 
Eugene did not care to sell the property. He had bought it 
on the premise that it was a good investment. As he 
stated in his letter to his mother, he would buy the pro-
perty if she thought it was a good investment. Harry 
never testified that he purchased the property as an 
investment. He wanted the land to build a reservoir 
thereon and to stake some cows thereon. Circumstances 
have given the property a great value as Eugene had 
hoped when he purchased it. Harry has had the benefit 
of the use of the land to stake his cows on, if not to build 
a reservoir thereon for 13 years. 
Whether the transaction is considered an equitable 
mortgage or a trust relationship if it involves the lending 
of money and the giving of a deed as security the burden 
is on the one asserting that the deed is not an absolute 
conveyance to establish "that both grantor and grantee 
understood that the conveyance was made as security for 
the debt and not as an abi::Jolute conveyance. If plaintiff 
fails to meet these conditions and burdens of proof her 
action must fail." Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 
2d 940. 
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The Court in its decision states that "It is not to be 
gainsaid that there is evidence which can be viewed as 
pointing both ways on this critical issue in dispute: 
"whether the deed from Harry Child conveyed full fee 
ownership to his son Eugene or only placed title in him to 
secure payment of the money he advanced his father to 
purchase the property." In other words, was this a 
security transaction~ Thus the question can only be, was 
this an equitable mortgage transaction~ Plaintiff in his 
brief concedes that the trial court did not find an equit-
able mortgage established by the evidence. As plaintiff 
said at pages 1 and 2 of his brief attacking points I and II 
of appellant's brief, which were a discussion of the evi-
dence upon the basis of an equitable mortgage relation-
ship: "fruitless and pointless in connection with the 
present appellant proceedings inasn1uch as there is no 
finding anywhere in the record nor any conclusion of 
law that the deed conveying title to property 'A' consti-
tutes an equitable 1nortgage. The Court will notice that 
plaintiffs' theory of equitable n1ortgage was pleaded 
under the first cause of action of his cmnplaint, but that 
the Trial Court, by n1inute entry (R. 1:2) expressly found 
the issues in favor of plaintiff under the Second ·Cause of 
Action and issued judg1nent tl1ereon. '' 
"We, therefore, suggest tl1at appellants' argument 
under their Points I and II pertaining to equitable mort-
gage is irrelevant and i1n1naterial to the ease before the 
Court and should be disregarded.'' 
Thus it appears that the plaintiff eoneedes that his 
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proof does not establish an equitable mortgage and 
agrees with the statement rnade in appellants' brief that 
the trial court did not believe that the evidence estab-
lished an equitable mortgage or that both respondent and 
appellants intended the deed to be a mortgage. 
Thus, the basis of this Court's decision IS not in 
accord with the theory of the respondent or the respond-
ent's interpretation of the Trial Court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Measured by the rules set forth above for determin-
ing clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence, the de-
fendants submit that the record is wholly wanting in 
evidence sufficient to support the judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff and respectifully requests the Court to 
grant a rehearing of this matter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. GRANT IVERSON 
Attorney for Defendants 
and Appellants 
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